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THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW: WHY
MARYA SCHECHTMAN CANNOT REQUIRE IT FOR
PERSONHOOD
Andrew S. Lane
Abstract In her book The Constitution of Selves, Marya
Schechtman names four features essential for personal existence:
survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and
compensation. She rejects reductionists theories of persons,
specifically that of Derek Parfit, claiming that they cannot support
the four features. Instead, she proposes a theory of persons which
she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View. Because she
believes this is required to support the four features, she also
argues that for an individual to be a person they must hold this
view. Drawing from the work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson,
I will argue that her arguments are inconsistent and do not show
that reductionist theories cannot support the four features. As a
result, I conclude that Schechtman is wrong to require the
Narrative Self-Constitution View for personhood.
This paper will deal with the theory of personal identity
proposed by Marya Schechtman in her book, The Constitution of
Selves.1 In this work, Schechtman claims that there are four basic
features of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-

1

Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996).

100

interested concern, and compensation.2 These she abbreviates as
the ―four features.‖ Regardless of potential additions or
emendations to the list, I will not question these features. As far
back as John Locke, accounting for moral responsibility is a key
motivation for personal identity theory and this continues with
more contemporary philosophers like Derek Parfit. Moral
accountability seems required for a functional society. If a person
at time T1 does not survive and there is a new person at time T2,
generally our intuition is that the person existing at time T2 would
not be responsible for the actions of person existing at time T1.
Thus, it seems necessary that a person must survive across time to
some extent, otherwise nobody could be held accountable for past
actions. The work of Galen Strawson will be useful in considering
this question of moral accountability. Self-interested concern and
compensation also seem necessary for ―personal‖ existence,
though not for ―impersonal‖ existence. It is not of necessity that
the former is better than the latter, but this essay will set such
considerations aside. I will take personal survival to be a valid
target, which is Schechtman's aim, without justifying whether or
not it is any better than impersonal survival. Schechtman believes
that Reductionist views, like that of Derek Parfit, cannot capture
the four features, and thus fail as accounts of personal identity.
Instead, she advocates what she calls the Narrative SelfConstitution View, which she feels is required in order to capture
the four features.
The Narrative Self-Constitution View holds that a person
creates his or her identity by forming an autobiographical
2
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narrative. According to this view,
the difference between persons and other
individuals...lies in how they organize their
experience, and hence their lives. At the core of
this view is the assertion that individuals
constitute themselves as persons by coming to
think of themselves as persisting subjects who
have had experience in the past and will
continue to have experience in the future, taking
certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all,
individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is
their doing so which makes them persons.3
Those who do not adhere to this narrative view, those who do not
think of themselves as persisting subjects and construct narratives,
are not persons according to Schechtman. I claim, however, that
the narrative self-constitution view is not the only way to capture
the four features. As a result, Schechtman is wrong to deny
personhood to individuals who do not view themselves narratively.
The motivation for her requirement that an individual view
themselves narratively is that to account for personal existence, we
need to capture the four features; thus, if we can capture the four
features another way, while this does not exclude her narrative
view as one of the potential ways, which I believe it is, it is not
required, and thus individuals who are non-narrative should not be
excluded from personhood.
The Reductionist View of Derek Parfit
Before considering the views of Derek Parfit, it will be
3
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useful to establish some distinctions concerning identity. First,
there is the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity.
For example, take two sheets of printer paper. The two sheets are
qualitatively identical, for they share the same qualities, but are not
numerically identical, because they are two different physical
objects. While the two sheets are not numerically identical with
each other, each is numerically identical with itself; each is one
and the same sheet of paper. This is one of the basic principles of
logic: self-identity.
Second, there is strict and non-strict identity. Strict identity
requires that X1 and X2 be exactly the same in all ways; the
smallest change of any kind destroys the strict identity of the
objects. With non-strict identity, however, some change is
permitted without destroying the non-strict identity of the objects.
With the paper example, X1 and X2 are not strictly qualitatively
identical, because if we compare closely enough, the fragments of
pulp are not arranged in exactly the same configuration. Strict
identity in this case would require that all the atoms making up the
paper, and their arrangement, be exactly qualitatively identical.
However, X1 and X2 may be considered non-strictly identical. For
most purposes, it would be more useful to a person to consider X1
and X2 (non-strictly) qualitatively identical, because what matters
to us about the sheets of paper is not on the level of atoms; for our
purposes the sheets are qualitatively identical. The criteria for what
qualifies for non-strict identity will vary depending on the objects
in question, and this will be dependent on the perspective of who is
considering the objects and their purposes. The strict/non-strict
distinction applies to numerical identity as well. With the problem
of personal identity, the two objects in question will be in different
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temporal locations. To say that the paper is self-identical in a given
moment considers space, while the time aspect is constant. When
considering whether the paper is numerically identical at different
moments also considers time. Strictly, the paper would not be
identical at different moments because the atomic makeup will
have slightly changed, for example from the effects of light.
However, we may say that they are non-strictly identical if all that
has changed are the atomic differences from light, because these
differences are irrelevant to what matters to us about paper.
One of Parfit's central concerns is moral accountability. As
mentioned in the introduction, if a person at time T1 is not the same
person at time T2, then it seems that the person at time T2 could not
be held accountable for the actions of the person at time T1, for
they are not the same person. When we look at an individual across
time, they are never strictly identical at two different times. Atoms
have changed and psychological makeup is in constant flux. Thus,
when speaking of an individual at two different times, they are
never strictly-identical on a reductionist account. If one holds that
there is, as Parfit would say, a further fact of identity, then one may
argue that there can be strict identity across time. If, for example,
there were an immaterial, eternal substance, perhaps a soul, and
this substance provides identity, then it may be strict identity. None
of the philosophers discussed in this essay argue for such a
substance, and because it is not within the scope of this paper to
properly argue against it, I will set this possibility aside. The
person at two different times may, however, be non-strictly
identical. The question then becomes, what criteria should we use
to decide whether or not they are (non-strictly) identical? For
Parfit, the mind is more important than the body and thus seems
104

the natural place to locate this identity. As a result, he articulates
psychological criteria for identity.
For this, Parfit defines three terms: psychological
connectedness, strong psychological connectedness, and
psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is ―the
holding of particular direct psychological connections.‖4 Parfit
cites memories, beliefs, desires and intentions as examples of
individual psychological connections. For example, if a person at
age 18 has the memory of running from a dog when they were
younger, and this person still has this memory when they are 20,
this would be an example of a direct psychological connection.
Parfit claims, ―since connectedness is a matter of degree, we
cannot plausibly define precisely what counts as enough. But we
can claim that there is enough connectedness if the number of
direct connections, over any day, is at least half the number that
hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.‖5
Strong connectedness means over half of the possible
psychological connections hold. Strong connectedness is not
transitive. A person at time T1 may be strongly connected to the
person at time T2, and the person at time T2 to the person at time
T3, but it does not follow that the person at time T3 is strongly
connected to the person at time T1. Psychological continuity is ―the
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness.‖ 6 While
strong connectedness is not a transitive relation, psychological
continuity is. Thus, the person at time T3 would be psychologically
4
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continuous with the person at time T1, because they are linked
through time T2 to which they are both strongly connected. A
person at two different times may be considered (non-strictly)
identical if and only if they are psychologically continuous. Like
the Buddhists and David Hume, Parfit claims that there is no Self,
where the Self would be an unchanging entity or essence that can
provide identity for an individual across time. That is, there is no
―further fact‖ of identity; identity simply consists in holding
psychological continuity.
The Extreme Claim and the Moderate Claim
In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that
we are Selfless persons, that there is no Self to provide the further
fact of identity, instead claiming that our identity simply consists in
overlapping chains of strong psychological connections, but thinks
that this is not such a terrible thing. In fact, he feels that adopting
this view was a positive change in his life. In response to his view,
however, he sees two possible reactions; one he calls the Extreme
Claim, the other the Moderate Claim.
The Extreme Claim says that ―if the Reductionist view is
true, we have no reason to be concerned about our own futures.‖7
If in the future, my future self will not be the same person as my
current self, then I have no reason to care for this person. It is not
me. For example, why should I care if smoking damages my body,
for it will not be me who dies of cancer. The Moderate Claim,
however, says that psychological continuity with a high degree of
connectedness gives us a reason to be concerned for our future
7
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selves.8 Parfit believes that even though it will not be the same
person in the future by strict criteria, it could be the same person
on a reductionist account, and the present person may still have
concern for the future person. He likens this to how we may be
concerned for our children, even if they are not us. The relations
that justify this are not a deep separate fact. If these relations give
us reason to care, then psychological continuity may give us
reason.
However, one may still object that it will not be one in the
future, so why should one be especially concerned today about
what one shall care about in the future? Why should a person care
about either their future selves or other people's future selves? To
this, Parfit says that he does not have an argument to completely
refute the extreme claim. Both claims, he thinks, are defensible.
Though, he believes that we are not forced to accept the extreme
claim. He wonders,
It may be wrong to compare our concern about
our own future with our concern for those we
love. Suppose I learn that someone I love will
soon suffer great pain. I shall be greatly
distressed by this news. I might be more
distressed than I would be if I learnt that I shall
soon suffer such pain. But this concern has a
different quality. I do not anticipate the pain that
will be felt by someone I love.9
Thus, because he cannot refute the Extreme Claim, he accepts it as
a defensible response to his position. However, he maintains that
8
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the Moderate Claim is also defensible. Neither claim, he thinks,
necessarily follows from his theory. Which claim a person holds
will depend on the feeling of that person.
Schechtman's Argument from the Extreme Claim
Schechtman believes that reductionism cannot support the
Moderate Claim and as a result we are forced to accept the
Extreme Claim. Because the Extreme Claim cannot support the
Four Features, Reductionism, she claims, cannot be true. She
maintains that instead of accepting this as an interesting result of
Parfit's theory of personal identity, it should be seen as a reductio
ad absurdum of Parfit's reductionist account, because it cannot
support the four features.10 Her argument has two premises.
Premise 1 is that ―the four features require numerical identity–
qualitative similarity will not do.‖11 This is because ―self-interested
concern is an emotion that is appropriately felt only toward my
own self and not toward someone like me. We all know the
difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the
pain of someone else.‖12 As Parfit himself recognized, this is a
difference of kind and not of degree. While we may potentially
care about another person's pain more than our own, we do not
―anticipate‖ the pain. Premise 2 claims that ―the psychological
continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being
me and someone being like me–that all identity amounts to on this
view is psychological similarity between distinct individuals.‖13
10
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Schechtman believes that the extreme claim follows from
these premises. If there is no difference between being the same
person, and being like a different person, how can we decide if it is
the same person, and thus how could we consider them to have
self-interested concern? If qualitative similarity between distinct
individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, then the
continuity theory fails to account for the importance of identity.
She believes that to avoid the Extreme Claim, we need a theory
where one and the same experiencing subject can exist at two
different times; if person-stages are the only subjects that have
experience in the theory, and person stages are not of the same
subject, then this cannot happen.14
The Tribal Example
Regardless of the Extreme Claim, Parfit insists that, even
though his rejection of the Non-Reductionist view led him to be
less concerned about his future, he was still more concerned about
his own future than that of a mere stranger.15 To account for this
concern, and to counter Schechtman's argument that we are forced
to accept the Extreme Claim, we need to deal with the problem of
anticipation. The Narrative Self-Constitution view, I argue, does no
better than reductionism on this account. We also need to show that
this concern is of a different character than the concern for others,
because otherwise she can simply claim that it is not self-interested
concern and thus does not capture the four features. To approach
this, let us look to an example that Schechtman herself uses while
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defending her demand for a conventional linear narrative against
the claim of chauvinism: the ―Tribal‖ example.
At some point, the deviation of an individual's
self-conception from the range of narratives
standard in our culture can be so great that
comprehension of and interaction with such
individuals becomes difficult. This is the sort of
divergence that can often be found in cases of
extreme cultural difference. In such a case the
narrative self-constitution view might recognize
that this culture has persons, but also note that
their concept of persons-and so the persons
themselves-are quite different from in our
culture. For instance, a tribal culture might
assign to an ancestral lineage much of the role
that the individual person plays in our culture–
responsibility, for instance, may be felt most
directly for all of the actions of an ancestral line
rather than for the actions of the individual
alone, and self-interested and survival concerns
may also be primarily attached the lineage.
Presumably the members of this culture would
also recognize what we call a single person as a
natural unit, but this unit would play a different
role in their interactions and practices.16
Schechtman would still consider these people, even though they
have distinct selves spanning multiple bodies across multiple
lifetimes. The person here, would thus involve the entire lineage,
which she feels means that their concept of a person is different,
but that they can still meet her criteria of supporting the four
16
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features. Schechtman does not deny that Parfit is correct that we
are distinct selves at different times; rather, she feels that we need
narrativity to connect these selves as a single subject in order to
capture the four features. Although Schechtman uses this example
to defend her theory, it may also be used to illuminate why we are
not forced to accept the Extreme Claim.
Why We Are Not Forced to Accept the Extreme Claim
We may now turn to Galen Strawson. He speaks of people
as either episodic or diachronic. Someone who is diachronic sees
themselves as existing across time and feels a deep connection to
their past, whereas an episodic ―has little or no sense that the self
that one is was there in the (further) past and will be there in the
future, although one is perfectly well aware that one has long-term
continuity considered as a whole human being. Episodics are likely
to have no particular tendency to see their life in Narrative
terms.‖17 Further, Galen Strawson thinks that ―the heart of Moral
responsibility, considered as a psychological phenomenon, is just a
sort of instinctive responsiveness to things, a responsiveness in the
present whose strength or weakness in particular individuals has
nothing to do with how Episodic or Diachronic or Narrative or
non-Narrative they are.‖18 For Strawson, moral responsibility does
not depend on whether or not it was the same (transient) self in the
past. He claims that he, the present self, feels responsibility for past
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actions that he, the present self, did not perform. While Strawson
most identifies with the present self, which he claims is very short
lived, he also recognizes that as a whole human being he exists
across time. People may feel a sense of responsibility for the
actions of their family members, or community, etc, even though
they did not perform them. This is especially easy to see in the case
of children. Parents often feel responsibility for the actions of their
child, even though they are fully aware that the child is a distinct
person. Strawson claims that in the case of responsibility, there is a
―phenomenon of natural transmission‖ that does not require
diachronic self-experience.19 For example, when a person dies their
family members often handle any obligations of the deceased that
remain open, including debt, regardless of the fact that they are
distinct persons. A person holds himself responsible when he feels
this sense of responsibility, even if the present self is not the same
self that committed the original action.
Parfit's theory considers a situation that is similar with his
Nobel Prize Winner example. He writes, ―Suppose that a man aged
ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize,
confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a
policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime,
this man may not now deserve to be punished.‖20 When
considering his accountability, we question his present state,
whether and in what way he is similar to the person who did the
action. In the case of the Nobel Prize winner, we look to see if the
present self is similar in certain ways to the past self, and this is
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relevant to whether or not we hold him responsible. That they may
be considered two different people does not preclude us from
holding the present person responsible for the past person's actions.
Does the present self, the Nobel Prize winner, still attack police
officers? Or, does he still have psychological similarities that are
relevant to this question? Is he peaceful, does he respect the police
and other people in general, does he have a temper, are all relevant
questions. Further, these questions affect whether or not he, the
Nobel Prize winner, will feel responsible for this action.
Schechtman, however, maintains that qualitative similarity
is not enough for responsibility, but this does not seem to be
universally the case. We find examples where people feel a sense
of responsibility even if they (the present self) did not perform the
actions. While Schechtman accepts transference between living
bodies in the Tribal example, within the life of a single human, this
is not much different. There are multiple selves within the lifetime
of one body instead of multiple lifetimes with multiple bodies; if
anything, this should be easier for Schechtman to accept than the
situation in the Tribal example. The difference is only one of
distance and greater known qualitative similarity. In contrast to the
above example, one may feel a much stronger sense of
responsibility for an action they committed yesterday than for the
actions of their ancestors. Here, they know a much greater amount
of qualitative similarity holds, and feel themselves to be much
more the same person. Even an episodic person may say this. In
the case of the Nobel Prize winner, the qualitative similarity may
be much weaker, and thus he may feel less responsible, for this is
pushing closer to the situation of someone feeling responsible for
an ancestor's actions as opposed to feeling responsible for the
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actions of yesterday. While this is not the same as it would be if it
were the same self, strictly speaking, feeling the responsibility as
who did the action, the practical result is not different in a
meaningful way; the responsibility, as a feeling, does not
necessarily require that it be the same self as the self who did the
action.
Schechtman allows that these tribal individuals are people,
just different people. They feel responsibility for their ancestor's
actions. Schechtman denies that we may feel responsibility for
what we, the present self, did not do if we accept the reductionist
view, but she will allow this if the conception of a person ranges
across multiple bodies, presumably if they are conceptualized in
the right way, with narrative. This allowance, however, can be
turned around. If a tribal person is allowed to range across multiple
bodies and lifetimes, even though Tribal body 1 will not feel the
pain of their son, Tribal body 2, they may still have concern for it,
and she must accept this in the tribal society for her theory to be
coherent. In this case, one may speak of self-interested concern
without anticipation, which is inconsistent with her argument for
why we are forced to accept the Extreme Claim. She doesn't argue
for why her theory allowing the tribal lineages to be people does
not apply equally in the case of a single individual with multiple
selves in our own society. She merely rejects this possible
conception of a person out of hand. Moreover, she gives no
argument to justify her particular choice for what it means to be a
person in our own society. Having considered the views of Parfit
and Strawson, it is clear that there are other options for what it
means to be a person and these alternative conceptions cannot be
ruled out just because they are different. It seems like she must
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actually require that these tribal individuals are not people, for they
cannot anticipate the actions as their own, or she must expand her
concept of anticipation so that if the individual conceptualizes
themselves in such a way that they have concern for future persons
they take to be themselves (in the non-present self sense), this must
be as acceptable as the anticipation she believes she establishes
with her narrative self-constitution view. Otherwise, her example is
meaningless, and she is open to the charge of chauvinism, for she
has no good reason to exclude other possible self-conceptions. And
thus, she is wrong to require her self-conception for personhood.
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